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Concentration Change and Countervailing Pow
the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries

JOHN M. CONNOR1, RICHARD T. ROGERS2 and VDAY BHAGAVAN

1 Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana;
2 Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachus

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the countervailing power
retailers has had a restraining influence on increases in seller market concentration in
food manufacturing industries. We empirically test this notion by examining changing
concentration (ACR4) from 1967 to 1987 across 48 processed food product classes. Em

model developed and tested by Venturini, we measure countervailing power of retailers wit
of market sales of private-label products.

For the 20-year period four variables were found to be significant determinants

However, for the most recent 1977-1987 period, virtually no significant determinants are d

Unlike Venturini, no evidence of countervailing power could be detected in the 1980s and o
or rarely in the longer period. We suggest that the lax federal antitrust enforcement of
measurement problems, or sampling criteria may be responsible for this unexpected outcom

Key words: Countervailing power, grocery retailing, food manufacturing, concentrati

private labels.

I. Introduction

The evidence that high sales concentration among U.S. food manufacturers leads to
higher-than-competitive selling prices and profits seems overwhelming. Drawing
on data from 1950 to the mid-1970s, numerous statistical investigations established

significant, positive relationships between seller concentration and oligopolistic
performance indicators (Connor et al. 1985: Chapter 7). These studies generally

give consistent predictions. When one compares the lowest observed levels of
concentration with the highest observed levels, ceteris paribus, processed food
prices rise about 10 to 1 4 percent, price-cost margins (gross margins) rise about 65
percent, and profits increase about 100-200 percent. Since most of these studies
were published, a number of criticisms have been raised about the assumptions
imbedded in the Bainsian structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach and the
interpretation of results. However, a recent survey of newer estimation techniques
that relax most of the SCP assumptions found that concentration continues to exert a
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference entitled 'Economics of Innovation

- The Case of the Food Industry', sponsored by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza,
Italy, June 10-1 1, 1994. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful reviews of Steve Erickson and
Paul Farris of Purdue University. Purdue Journal Paper Number 14317.
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efficiency1 that has caused econ
orable rise in food industry conc
four food manufacturers selling
an

average of about 40 percent of t
the 1 987 Census of Manufactures

at least 60 percent in national foo
The two determinants of changin
industries were believed to be w

"regression toward the mean" ef
related to change in concentratio
more specifically the electronic
presumably by creating long-lasti
have failed to confirm that eithe
scale had any significant effects
(1993) proposed that Rogers' mod
known two-stage, game theory m
competition by retailers as an exp
with 1958-1977 data from the U.
proxy for vertical competition d
finding, if upheld, has important
The issue known to economists a
cally the same as the question ad
Has market power shifted from f
Opinion surveys of food marketi
toward retailers. A 1992 survey o
found agreement among all three
agreed) and that the shift favore

Grocer',

April,

1992,

Part

2,

p.

major reasons for increased retail
manufacturers, which has forced

including slotting
to information on

and renewal al
product sales d

1 Rising concentration may give rise to
the evidence is not so clear as it is for sta

That is, omitting highly localized mar
soft-drink bottling, and manufactured ic

markets is not available.

3 The period covered in Rogers' study was 1958-1977. Retesting this model with 1967-1982
changes in concentration upheld the earlier results (Tokle, Rogers, and Adams, 1990).
4 The finding also calls into question whether the static structure-performance results were misspecified by omitting measurements of retailer power. See the literature review below.
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out technology; (3) increased grocery retailer concentration in local ma

slowing overall growth and declining effectiveness of advertising in food

and (5) greater numbers of private-label programs.
Yet, rigorous tests of this alleged shift in power have yet to be seen. W
retailer concentration has indeed increased in the United States, food man

concentration properly measured increased apace (Marion et al ., 1987).
inflation-adjusted amount spent on food advertising by manufacturers
almost constant in the 1980s, that is hardly evidence that advertising eff
has declined. The most satisfactory approach taken to analyze this ques
been to look at relative profit rates or stock prices of manufacturers an
over time. Farris and Ailawadi (1992) examined the profits of listed com
from 1972 to 1990 and concluded that grocery retailer profits were stead
food manufacturer profits rose. A similar study using somewhat bette
found that comparing 1986-1991 profits on equity with 1961-1966 prof
manufacturers' profits rose much more than retailers (Messinger and Nar

1993, Table 12). Therefore, there is a contradiction between busines
opinions on this issue and the scant quantitative analyses available.5

The purpose of this paper is to explore further the role of countervailin
by grocery retailers on changing concentration in the U.S. food manuf
industries. We develop and test alternative models of concentration chang
measures of vertical competition. In addition, we extend the period invest
Venturini (1993) by ten years to 1987. There are several reasons to believ

decade of the 1980s might yield quite different results than earlier period

H. Countervailing Power

John Kenneth Galbraith takes full credit for inventing the concept of co
ing power. "The notion ... has been almost completely excluded from ec
thought" (Galbraith, 1952, pp. 1 10-1 11). Yet, finding a precise definitio
braith's writing proves to be difficult. Perhaps the statement that com

is:

Private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those

who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward
concentration of industrial enterprise . . . has brought into existence not only
strong sellers . . . .but also strong buyers (ibid., p. 1 1 1)

Thus, according to Galbraith, countervailing power is an autonomous regulator
of competition, which operates much like Adam Smith's invisible hand to check
increases in seller concentration or improve static performance in the sellers'
industry. The automatic nature of the countervailing power of organized buyers fits

in well with Galbraith's evident disdain for government antitrust policies.
5 There is a more satisfactory body of studies examining the relative power of farmers' marketing
cooperatives and food manufacturers (see Rogers and Petraglia, 1994).
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III. The Venturini Model

Venturini (1993) must be credited with bringing economists back to a consideration

of the dynamic implications of the countervailing power of distributors, which
he has rechristened "Vertical Competition." Venturini's model explaining market
concentration change draws on concepts from John Sutton's (1991) well-known
book. Sutton, frustrated by the difficulties of operationalizing theoretical models of
oligopoly, sought a simple, but robust prediction on the relationship between market

concentration and market size. This question has occupied industrial-organization
6 Scherer and Ross (1990) also discuss a related hypothesis. Sellers in producer-goods industries
should have higher margins if the inputs they sell are "unimportant" to buyers {i.e., the intermediate
products form a small share of all inputs used by buyers). At least three statistical studies confirm
this relationship in U.S. manufacturing.
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economists since the seminal book by Joe Bain (1966) on internationa
in industrial concentration.

In brief, Sutton's theory and empirical findings demonstrate that in the limit a negative relationship is present for industries where sunk costs of entry are
exogenous, but the tendency toward déconcentration is lost when firms can pursue strategies to increase sunk costs-the case of endogenous sunk costs (Connor
1992). The other major factor affecting market concentration is the degree of pricing toughness. When pricing is tough, markets will become more concentrated, as

firms require larger market shares to cover their sunk costs. When pricing competition is lax, more firms can survive. Pricing toughness is in turn affected by
government industrial policies and the degree of product differentiation. Pricing
toughness would lessen as product differentiation increased, shifting the emphasis
from price to nonprice rivalry. International comparisons of a series of historical case studies of the food industries provided empirical verification of Sutton's
theoretical predictions.
Venturini extended Sutton's theory to include vertical competition between
food distributors and food manufacturers. Venturini is specifically interested in
the relationship between the branded and unbranded segments in the food sector
and how vertical competition will affect market concentration. He hypothesized
that industries that experience an increase in the share held by private labels will
experience déconcentration. This hypothesis is justified with two models.
In the first "technological" model, Venturini divides the consumers into two
groups. Type I consumers of manufacturer brands are loyal to products, and Type
II consumers are foodservice firms or retailers who purchase the food products
to sell as own brands. The first group defines the size of the branded sector, 0,

and the second group defines the size of the unbranded and private label sector,

1-9 , where 0 < 9 < 1 . The private label segment is characterized by smaller
manufacturing firms that do not advertise but compete solely on the basis of
efficiency in production and distribution. These smaller firms can co-exist with the
larger, marketing-oriented firms, because Type II consumers are unwilling to pay
for the higher costs of marketing and advertising that brand manufacturers must

incur.

These two groups of firms are assumed to be distinct - no manufacturing
firm supplies both types of buyers. The relationship between these two strategic
groups is of primary interest in Venturini' s work. The fixed costs of each of these

strategic groups will be markedly different. The branded group's fixed costs of
production will consist of the sunk setup cost for a minimum efficient scale plant
and endogenously determined advertising costs ( MES' ). The unbranded-private
label group's fixed costs consist only of the costs involved in setting up an MES
plant ( MES2 ). Given that the branded group's fixed costs are larger, then MES' >
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equal size, the Herfindahl-H

(1)
Then substituting N = 6S/MES' and M = (1 - 6)S/MES2, he found:

H = 9*MjM + {1_e)^MES2^ (2)
where N and M are the equilibrium number of firms in the branded segment and
private-label segment, and S is the total market size. Given that M E S' > M E S2,
the partial derivative of H in [2] with respect to 6 is positive. Therefore, as the
private-label share, (1 - 0), increases, concentration will fall, even though market
size remains constant.

Venturini' s second theoretical model builds on Sutton's two-stage, CournotNash model with advertising an endogenous sunk cost for manufacturers of branded
products. In the first stage, higher advertising expenditures could enhance the
demand for a firm's product in the second stage. In this model there are again
two groups of consumers, two strategic groups of manufacturers, and no dual
branding. In the branded strategic group, advertising is positive and endogenous,
while advertising is zero in the unbranded group. The equilibrium number of firms
in both strategic groups (N and M ) is an outcome of Cournot-Nash competition.
Under certain parametric assumptions, the partial derivative of H w.r.t. 6 yields:

dH (252 + l)[(l-0)5]V2

~d0~0

~2&

•

(3)

A numerical analysis shows that,
concentration will increase. Only
Venturini also shows that H declines with increases in S.

Therefore, taking into account both of Venturini 's models, a behavioral model
of the following form is suggested:

AH = a + /?i (PL) + fo- S, (4)
where PL = ( 1 - 0) is the private-label share

(2) and (3), we expect ß' < 0 and ßi < 0. Bec

index of sales concentration H has only been

1987, too brief a span, we use ACR4 in p

indexes are known to be highly correlated w
two indexes ought to be closely correlated a
be augmented with other explanatory variab
empirical studies.
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IV. Private Labels and Vertical Competition in the Food Industrie

A critical feature of Venturini 's model is the assumption that the share

label products in total product category sales (PL) is a reasonable prox

countervailing power of grocery retailers. In this section we examine th

of private-label products, describe their empirical significance in the fo

and appraise the suitability of PL as a variable in industrial-organization
Foods and beverages sold in grocery stores may be divided into three

ly significant categories: manufacturers' or packers' brands, private-labe
and unbranded products. All prepackaged foods in the United States are
have on their labels "manufactured by. . . ," "packed by. . . ," or "distribut
The first two cases are commonly called "national brands" or "manufa
brands," many of which are distributed in only a few states of the U

facturers* brands account for about two-thirds of the sales of grocery f

measured at manufacturers' shipments values (Connor et al , 1985,

degree of consumer loyalty or repetitive purchases varies along a spectr
very strong to relatively weak. "Coca-Cola" and "Marlboro" are widely r
as strong brands, but some brands are very weak. For example, most eg

in U.S. stores with the name of the packer on the egg carton, but mo
stores sell only one brand of eggs on a given day and frequently chang
of eggs they stock in the store. This is an example of weak brand loyal
that eggs could just as well be sold in cartons without the packer's nam
words, very weak packer brands shade into the private-label category.
Private-labels are also known as "store brands" or "controlled brand
British English are called "own brands"). Private-label products have la
tell the consumer who is responsible for distributing the item, but the m
er's name is practically never shown. The brand shown on the private
item is either a trademark owned by a grocery chain (a true "store br
trademark owned by a wholesale distributor7 (a true "controlled bran

brand programs are typically found among the 40 to 50 largest U.S. gro
chains, whereas smaller chains and independent stores contract with w
to use their controlled brands (Marion et al , 1987). Thus, it is not unu
the same private-label trademarks in the stores of two or more smaller

the same city. Most commercial data sources cannot distinguish betwe
store brands and wholesaler controlled brands.

The leading grocery chains obtain their private-label products in two way
most large chains vertically integrate backward into food manufacturin
(1975) presented data that the 40 largest U.S. grocery chains manufact
in their own plants that accounted for 9.8 percent of their retail sales in

share dropped to 6.9 percent in 1967 and has remained at about 7 percent

(Marion et al ., 1987, Table 5-8). Grocery retailers account for about 2.5
total food manufacturing output in the United States, but it is highly co
7 The distributor is usually a U.S.-based grocery wholesaler, but in some cases it is the
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affect the enterprise images of grocer
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In the United States, private-label p
of total grocery-store sales volume

closely related to macroeconomic con
in 1982, a year of deep recession an
about 10 percent by 1988 during ye
percent in the early 1990s. Private l
countries.8
Private-label penetration in the United States varies considerably across product
categories. In 1980, private-label (and generic) products accounted for very low
sales shares in canned baby food {PL = 0.7 percent), ready-to-eat breakfast cereals

(3.0 percent), and frozen dinners (4.2 percent) (Connor et al.y 1985, p. 222).
However, PL was very high in sugar (54.6 percent), frozen orange juice (54.0
percent), canned peaches (50.5 percent), and canned tomatoes (49.6 percent). An
even more complete study of 1980 shares found that private-label products as

a group were the leading "brand" in 81 out of 378 warehoused food product
categories. Data from 1993 show that U.S. private-label shares are in most cases
similar to 1980 (Galbraith, 1993; Shapiro, 1993).
There is considerable research trying to explain cross-sectional variation in PL.
Parker (1975) showed that backward vertical integration into food manufacturing
in the 1960s by grocery retailers was significantly positively correlated with concentration in food manufacturing; the simple correlation coefficient ranged from
+0.45 to +0.68. Parker considered this strong evidence that the manufacture of
8 In 1992-1993, private-label foods had captured almost 30 percent of the sales in British and
Swiss super-markets, more than 20 percent of the French and German, and almost 20 percent of the
Dutch and Belgian markets (Ogilvie, 1994, p. 26; Hughes, 1994). The French retailer Carrefour sells
more than 3,000 store brands that are priced on average 15 percent lower than the leading brands
in the same category. The leading U.K. grocery retailer, Sainsbury, has 8,000 private-label items out

of 16,000 items in its average store (de Lisser and Helliker, 1994). Moreover, Sainsbury has been
introducing 1,400 to 1,500 new private-label products each year, while dropping hundreds of others
that have proved unpopular. Gross margins on Sainsbury 's private-label products are twice as high
as the margins on manufacturers' brands. The extensive private-label programs of European grocery
retailers have been aided by the formation of international wholesale "buying groups" (Linda, 1993).

CONCENTRATION CHANGE AND COUNTERVAILING POWER 48 1

private-label products occurs in industries with market power, unless the indu
was too small to allow retailers to achieve economies of scale or the loyalty

manufacturers' brands was too great. Later, Parker and Connor (1979) exten

this analysis to the determinants of the total PL share, both own-manufacture

purchased. Using 1 976 data on 41 processed-food classes,9 they fitted the follo
equation:

PL - 36.0 - 0.22CR4- 2.31TAS, R2 = 0.94

(3.78) (4.33) ( '

where TAS is the total media advertisingparentheses). Therefore in this sample, ne
by manufacturing CR4 and the intensity o
Other researchers have found that PL hel
or selling prices. A small study by Horst ( 1

(= 1 when PL was high) had a significant

firms' profits as a percent of stockholders
price-cost margins. A more ambitious stu
food-brand prices found that private-label p

prices of comparable manufacturers' brand

1989).
Private-label share would seem to be an incomplete measure of vertical competition between food retailers and food manufacturers. Relative information access,
temporal measures of advertising or promotion effectiveness, and measures of the
actual share of promotions received by retailers relative to manufacturers' willingness to pay are all potentially useful indicators of relative power. However, none of
these is measurable at this time to our knowledge. By contrast, PL is measurable,
though difficult or expensive to obtain.
It seems desirable to include the sales of both regular private-labels and generics
in any measure of PL . But what about the third category of grocery productsunbranded goods? Unbranded foods are found mainly in fresh meats and seafood,
fresh fruits and vegetables, random-cut cheeses, and certain delicatessen items.

These items are purchased in bulk and sorted or wrapped by retailers in their
stores. Because retailers have typically resisted encroachment by branded products
into their unbranded product categories, we believe that it is appropriate lo include
unbranded sales in any measure of PL as we have done in this study.
9 These 41 five-digit SIC product-class observations were built up from 167 finer product categories taken from a leading commercial supplier of grocery market information. The sample included

all warehouse grocery categories with PL > 5 percent
10 Being held constant are advertising intensity {TAS), the leading brand market share, and
generics' presence and share. This monumental study had a sample of thousands of brands of
processed foods and beverages.
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VI. Variable Definitions

1. Change in CR4(ACR4)
The dependent variable is the absolute percentage point difference between ending

concentration (Cfi487) and beginning concentration (either CRA11 or CÄ467),
where concentration is measured by the percentage four-firm concentration ratio.
11 Miscellaneous food products SIC 20999 or SIC 20873, soft drink syrup manufacturing was
combined in just one observation on soft drinks, SIC 2086, to account for the vertical nature ofthat
industry).
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Others, most notably Wright (1978), rejected this specification due to

edness [0, 100] and used a transformed dependent variable that treate
in concentration from 4 to 5 the same as a change from 40 to 50 or fr
(see Rogers, 1984 for details). Previous research found Wright's specif
negligible effects on the estimates. We use only the simple arithmetic d
this paper.

2. Initial Concentration Ratio (ICR)
ICR is the beginning year's four-firm concentration. In their survey article on
concentration-change studies, Cuny and George (1 983) conclude that ICR was the
most important explanatory variable. A negative relationship is expected because

leading firms in concentrated industries are likely to lose market share over
time to fringe firms by following dominant-firm strategies. In addition, empirical researchers find unconcentrated industries tend to increase in concentration

over time (Rogers 1984). ICR helps correct for the boundedness in A CR.

3. Initial Size (IS)
Industry size is measured by the natural logarithm of value of shipments in the
initial year. Including IS follows directly from Equation (4).

4. Growth (GRO)
Since this is a concentration change study, some economists might argue that the
most relevant variable is change in industry size or the industry's growth rate.
In previous concentration-change studies, growth was the most commonly used
explanatory variable, yet it has both theoretical and empirical support for either a
negative or a positive influence on concentration change. If large firms outgrow
small firms, as they might during strong merger waves, then growth could lead

to higher concentration. However, if growth creates niches that encourage new
entry on a small scale, then growth should result in lower concentration. Growth is
measured by the percentage increase in value of shipments over time.

5. Advertising Intensity (TAS)
Economists differ on whether advertising impedes or encourages entry into consumer goods markets. A new firm entering a market with established firms that
have been advertising their products for decades will likely turn to advertising to
inform consumers of its new presence in the market. To switch consumers, entrants

will usually have to advertise or promote their products more intensely than the
incumbents. This use of advertising to assist entry is often cited as supporting the

position that advertising aids entry. However, the higher advertising intensity of
new entrants might trigger a reaction from existing firms who would escalate their
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6. Private Label Share (PL)
Vertical competition is measured by the percent share held by private label (and
generic) products. The 1977 private label share, which includes unbranded food
product sales, was calculated by Connor (1982). As PL increases we would expect
retailers to countervail, as shown in Equation (4).

7. Minimum Efficient Size (MES)
MES serves as a technical barrier to entry created by economies of scale and,
therefore, should be positively related to ACR. Four times MES is a lower bound

on CR4. The MES value is critical to Sutton's model because it is a proxy for
the exogenous sunk costs a firm must commit to enter an industry. In Venturini 's

technological model, the effect of MES is already included in PL. Despite its
theoretical appeal, the empirical proxies available suffer substantial shortcomings.
The method of calculating MES in this and most other studies rely on the midpointplant size approach calculated from Census data. Although this approach has been
shown to be highly correlated with the preferred economic-engineering estimates
(Connor et al. 1985), the approach still suffers from being limited to single-product
plant level economies of scale, rather than scope or firm level. Also it has an upward
bias whenever constant costs are found, since large firms can expand beyond MES

levels without a cost disadvantage. Moreover, as MES is by construction positively
highly related to concentration, we make only limited use of it in models where
initial concentration is included.

To summarize, the augmented version of Equation (4) takes the following form:

ACR4 = a+ßi ICR+foPL + ßtGRO+ßsIS+foTAS+fcMES + e

(-) (-) (-) (+) (+) ' (6)
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where the expected signs of the regression coefficients are given in pa
For these coefficients, we apply one-tail tests of statistical significanc
growth variable GRO has an ambiguous prediction.
8. Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of the main variables are given in Table III of Connor

et al (1995). Concentration, as measured by the CR4, did increase on averag

over the two time periods of interest. A larger average increase took place in th
second decade of 1977 to 1987 than in the decade from 1967 to 1977. By 1987,
average sample concentration had increased 7.5 percentage points to reach near
60 percent. The total advertising-to-sales ratio, TAS, had an average value of 2
percent in 1 977 and 2.8 percent in 1 987. Since the data set excludes producer goo
industries, no industry had zero advertising but substantial range does exist - fro

a low of 0.02 percent (vinegar and cider) to a high of 1 1 .7 percent (chewing gu

in 1977.

PL , the percentage share held by private labels, in our sample averaged nearl
13 percent in 1977 and increased to nearly 17 percent in 1987, with substantia
variation in each year as some industries had no private label sales and one (broiler

had over half of its sales in the private label category. Although different procedur

were used to calculate private label shares in 1977 and 1987, the data appear quite

consistent.

Industry size varied dramatically from the veiy small (canned mushrooms) t
the very large (soft drinks). Growth in value of shipments measured in nomin
terms increased on average 71 percent over the 1977 to 1987 period. The use of

nominal growth does fail to capture the declining size of the cigarette industry
its price increases more than offset its reduced volume sold during this period

Finally, minimum efficient scale (MES), had an average value of 3 percent

1987, implying about 33 single-plant firms of optimal size would fit in the avera
food industry.

Simple correlations for the main variables are given in Table IV of Connor

et ai (1995) for the 1977 to 1987 period. Not surprisingly, CR477 and grow

are negatively related to concentration change. But unexpectedly, the private lab
variables are positively related to concentration change and all of die advertis-

ing variables are negatively related. MESH has the lowest simple correlatio

Although simple correlations among independent variables do not give the full
picture of potential multicollinearity problems, when two variables have a high
correlation it can prove difficult to unravel their independent explanatory power
an OLS regression. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the high correlations betwee

PL and CR411 and T ASH . In fact, a regression of PL on just CR4 and TAS

(and T AS squared) yields a strong fit in each year, explaining just over half of th
observed variation. This relationship between PL and standard structural variable

is a concern for empirical testing of the vertical competition hypothesis. The hig
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VII.

O

LS

Regression

Results

The most basic model that contro
concentration {I CRII) shows no su
share in 1977 is negatively related
1987 period (Table I, Equation la). T
brevity of the time period, we exp
and reestimated the same model, u
(Equation lb). The results were mo
was negative and significant at the
TAS11 for the private label variab
history of research, the coefficient
was estimated over the longer 1967
moved toward positive significanc
significance levels (Equation 2b). In
variables for electronic and print
significance. The last model of Ta
and 4b). As expected, the collineari
t statistics compared with earlier e
This difference in the results bet
1967 to 1987 period will show itse
period is continually marked by i
effects over the standard results f
concentration change finding is sp
of

that

can

era,

or

whether

it

marks

th

tell.

In Tables II and IH, we undertook
to alternative samples and variable
E), we calculated some interaction
private label and initial concentrat
centration

dummy split at CRA of
in concentrated and unconcentrat
empirical support suggests that pri
effect in the more concentrated m
tion

5b)

5a), neither interaction term w
the private-label effect was ne
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TABLE IL Regression results explaining
food and tobacco manufacturing industr

Independent

Time

variables

6a

5a

5b

Periods:

a

-

197

6b

ICR -0.052 -0.346a -0.065 -0.261a

(-0.636) (-3.082) (-0.953) (-2.582)
GRÒ -0.028 -0.012 -0.031 -0.012

(-1.378) (-1.349) (-1.608) (-1.349)
TVR -0.425 0.853

(-0.761) (1.029)
PLULA

-0.003

-0.256e

(-0.025) (-1.619)
PLH H A (0.083) (0.059)
(0.503) (0.229)
PLH - CR4 < -0.006 -0.261e

50 (-0.059) (-1.620)
PL77 • CR4 > 0.074 0.183

50 (0.360) (0.610)

R2 0.014 0.135 0.026 0.131

Note: t statistics given in parentheses; superscripts a,
significance from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level

insignificant for the more concentrated industrie

In Equations 6a and 6b, the interaction betwee
TAS - 1 %) was tested. Again in the shorter per
longer period, private label share ( P LIT LA ) di
for industries with low advertising intensities.

industries, private label share was unrelated to
The four models that are presented in Table i

in the effect from advertising intensity. Becau
its two forms did not prove successful, we lim

In the first two models, we omit PL and us

prove significant in the shorter time period (Eq
TAS11 reaches positive significance at the 10 pe

quadratic term remains positive throughout the
8 is the first time we included the MESH vari

significant in both periods. This finding is cons

larger the MES , the fewer firms that will be abl

However, readers should recall our reservations

variable. In the longer 1967 to 1987 period, the
provide improved results with both the advertis
overall the model provides the highest adjusted
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The last two models in Table HI
in the TAS11 variable by limiting

industries
values

(chewing

exceeding

TASCAP

.

This

8

is

gum,

percent

a

check

11.7%
were

on

g

wh

estimation difficulties, especially
to 1 Ob suggest that the extreme
TASCAP and its square are signific
of the TAS values. However, the t

9a

levels

of

either

PL

or

IS.

Althou

best-filling models, none approac
Rogers' (1984) best models.12
VID. Conclusions

We fail to find any evidence supporting a dynamic version of Galbraith's count

vailing-power hypothesis. Nothing in our empirical work can be construed

support for the idea that retailer vertical competition kept U.S. food-manufactur

from becoming more concentrated in the 1980s, though Venturini found such
relationship in earlier periods. Nor can we find support for Sutton's (1991) mod
that suggests that industry size is inversely related to concentration. The reason
for rejecting these models deserve investigation.
There are three avenues that we believe may reward further empirical effort
First, our results for the 1980s may be due to special characteristics of the decad
We have already mentioned the egregiously lax enforcement of U.S. antitrust law

especially merger controls. We note that Rogers and Ma (1994) also find that t
pre- Venturini models of concentration change have broken down in the 1980s. It

quite common for macroeconomic conditions to break previously sturdy structur
relationships. In their study of the influence of buyers' concentration on allocati

efficiency, Clevinger and Campbell (1977) also found the significance of buyer
CR4 sensitive to time period.

12 In some further testing, not reported here, we found that the effect from ICR did differ depen

ing on whether the industry was initially concentrated or unconcentrated. The more concentra
industries displayed a much smaller (about one-half the size) estimated coefficient than was found
the unconcentrated (CR4 < 50) industries. This result is consistent with that found by Tokle, Roger
and Adams (1990) for all manufacturing industries over the 1967 to 1982 period. Additionally, l

Venturini, we found that the deconcentrating effect from growth differed for industries with low adve

tising (less than 1%) from that found in higher advertising industries. Only in the low-advertis
industries did growth have a significant deconcentrating effect. In addition, we estimated a model

the 1977 to 1987 period where every variable was entered in both its 1977 level (e.g., PL11) an
as an absolute change from 1977 to 1987 (except for growth, which was a percentage change).
these models both PL and change in PL took negative signs, but insignificant. Growth was negat
and significant at the 10 percent level. The change in TAS was insignificant, both in a statisti
sense and in magnitude, but the level variable, TASI!, was negative and significant, contrary to
expectations.
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Second, our results may depend on the particular measure of private label
PL that we devised. Perhaps in the 1980s food manufacturers developed str
gies (e.g., promotional expenditures) to counteract effectively against privat
programs. Perhaps the PL measure should exclude unlabeled products. Perh
retailer backward vertical integration works differently from contractual pr
label purchases. Perhaps the information advantages of retailers have becom
major source of countervailing power, and private-label programs no longer p
any clout for retailers.

Third, more attention needs to be given to alternative market samples. M
and Kim (1991) concluded that statistical studies of concentration change r
have nothing to say about producer-good industries in food manufacturing
is obvious that the largest increases in food-industry concentration occurr
producer-good industries or nearly homogenous-good consumer industries,
as beefpacking (Connor, 1991). This upheaval in historical patterns in the 198
a most curious phenomenon.
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